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This paper examines the policy dilemmas and challenges faced by developing country 
governments when confronted with rising food prices, especially when it comes to the prices of 
basic foods such as rice and corn.  One option for governments is to let domestic prices adjust to 
reflect the full change in international prices.  However, this generates inflationary pressures, 
and if poor households lack savings or access to credit and social safety nets are inadequate, 
high food prices can cause severe hardship. Countries with large international reserves could 
mitigate these effects by appreciating their currency. But an exchange rate appreciation hurts the 
tradable sector and may cause macroeconomic imbalances down the road. Alternatively, 
governments can use food subsidies or export restrictions to stabilize domestic prices, shifting 
the burden of adjustment back on to international markets.  The former measures exacerbate 
global food price fluctuations, hence are a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy response which 
undermines a rules-based trading system and reduces welfare particularly in food importing 
countries. Without a multilateral solution to food price volatility in international markets, 
however, it is not surprising that developing countries pursue what is perceived as best for them 
even if the rest of the world is made worse off. With the introduction of biofuels, food 
commodity prices are likely to behave more like industrial commodity prices, so episodes of 
rapidly rising food commodity prices are bound to happen more frequently in the future. 
Biofuels not only lead to a rise in the long-term price of food staples but will also make food 
prices much more sensitive to the business-cycle much more than in the past.  “Beggar-thy-
neighbor” policies will become a common practice every time nonrenewable energy prices go 
up. 
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World prices of food commodities rose sharply from January 2002 until June 2008. 
(Figure 1) The IMF’s index of internationally traded food commodities prices increased 130 
percent and individual agricultural commodities show even more pronounced increases.
 3  
(Figures 2) Price increases accelerated since 2004 and especially between mid-2007 and mid-
2008. Since July 2008, food commodities prices started to fall. From June until October 2008, 
they declined by 27 percent but they were still higher than in January 2007. Although domestic 
food prices have not risen as rapidly as international ones, in many poor countries food inflation 
increased quite sharply. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa food inflation increased to more 
than 17.7 percent and reached 80 percent in Ehiopia.
4  In Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and 
Costa Rica it increased to 20 percent and it reached 30 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic and Sri 
Lanka for a similar period.
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  When confronted with rising food prices governments in developing countries face 
difficult policy dilemmas, especially when it comes to the prices of basic foods such as rice and 
corn.  One option is to let domestic prices adjust to reflect the full change in international prices, 
shifting the burden of adjustment to their own private sector.  Since food represents a relatively 
large share of developing countries’ consumption baskets, this causes inflationary pressures and 
hurts the living standards of poor net consumers.
6  Countries with large international reserves 
could mitigate these effects by appreciating their currency. However, an exchange rate 
appreciation hurts the tradable sector
7 and may cause macroeconomic imbalances down the 
road. Governments could also use safety nets to protect the poor from rising prices. However, in 
many developing countries safety nets are lacking or inadequate.   In addition, safety nets for the 
poor do not help contain inflationary pressures or protect households in the middle of the 
distribution who are hurt by high food prices too. Alternatively, governments can use food 
subsidies or export restrictions to stabilize domestic prices, shifting the burden of adjustment 
back on to international markets.  The former measures exacerbate global food price 
fluctuations, hence are a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy response which undermines a rules-
based trading system. While administrative measures have costs for the countries that 
implement them, these may be smaller than the alternative, particularly when prices are subject 
to large fluctuations within short time periods. Without a multilateral solution to food price 
                                                 
3 For example, from January 2002 to June 2008 the international price of corn, wheat, rice and soybeans rose by 190, 
162, 318 and 246 percent, respectively. Data from IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Prices for corn refer to 
Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tone; for wheat to Wheat, No.1 
Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne; for rice to Rice, 5 percent broken 
milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per metric tonne; finally, for soybeans to Soybeans, U.S. 
soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per metric tonne. 
4 From January until September 2008. 
5 World Bank (2008b, 2008c). 
6 This option, however, benefits net-sellers including those who are poor. 
7 The so-called “Dutch Disease.”   4
volatility in international markets, it is not surprising that developing countries pursue what is 
perceived as best for them even if the rest of the world is made worse off.   
 
Using the recent period of rising food commodities prices, this paper examines the 
policy dilemmas and challenges faced by developing country governments when confronted 
with volatile food prices. It starts with an overview of the main drivers of the acceleration in 
food price increases especially since 2004.  The paper goes on to show that rising food prices 
caused significant inflationary pressures and increased poverty. Section 3 presents a sample of 
the complex policy dilemmas and challenges that governments in developing countries face. 
Section 4 presents concluding remarks.  
 
1. The Causes of Food Commodities Price Volatility 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the factors that have been identified as potentially significant 
in explaining the phenomenon of rising food prices. Not all of them have survived a closer 
scrutiny, though. A review of the literature suggests that--in addition to temporary idiosyncratic 
factors such as bad weather and higher costs linked to energy prices—a key driver of the 
acceleration in food commodities price increases since 2004 was the shift in demand for 
industrial use due to the surge in the production of biofuels in advanced countries.  Since mid-
2007 and until mid-2008, price increases accelerated even further and fell sharply since.  While 
the market dynamics during this period are still not well understood, a combination of 
macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates in the 
United States, and export-restricting policies on the part of developing countries seem to have 
played an important role.
8   
 
By and large, the performance of agriculture over the past twenty five years has been 
viewed as a success story. Between 1980 and 2004, output grew at an average of 2 percent per 
year and prices fell at an average of 1.6 percent.
9 Due to supply-side constraints arising from 
land and water scarcity and slow technical progress,
 10 this success story was about to come to 
                                                 
8 Given the methodological difficulties involved, however, an attempt to estimate the exact contribution of each of 
these factors using econometrics or a comprehensive simulation model would be an impossible task. 
9 World Bank (2007), p. 51. Low prices were also the consequence of agricultural support policies in the European 
Union and the United States (IFPRI, 2003). 
10 In the more densely populated areas of the world—primarily Asia-- the land frontier has been exhausted.  In Latin 
America there is still room for land expansion but this often comes at the expense of tropical and subtropical forests. 
While in Sub-Saharan Africa there is great potential for land expansion, this would require large investments in 
infrastructure, human capital and agricultural extension. Water is likely to become increasingly scarce and irrigated 
agriculture would have to compete with the demand from larger and larger industrial sectors and urban centers.  
Climate change is likely to worsen the availability of arable land and water for agricultural use. Slowed R&D 
spending cautions one to expect technological breakthroughs any time soon.  The supply-side constraints had already 
started to manifest themselves as a decline in the growth rates of yields of major cereal crops in developing countries.   5
an end. Analysts at IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute) and the FAO predicted 
that food prices would rise by 0.26 percent per year until 2030 and 0.82 percent per year from 
2030 to 2050.
11 However, in the first years of this decade, the increase was much larger. From 
January 2002 to July 2008, the price index of internationally traded food commodities prices 
increased by about 20 percent per year or 100 times more than the predictions of the “business 
as usual” scenarios (!).   
 
A closer analysis of what happened to demand and supply in the markets for grains and 
oilseeds from 2000 onwards may help explain this unexpected hike in prices. Table 2 
summarizes the trends in harvested area, yields, food consumption, industrial use and stocks-to-
use ratios for corn, rice, wheat and oilseeds. Evidence suggests that there was a steady decline in 
harvested area (for corn and wheat in particular) at the beginning of the decade, a likely result of 
low prices in the past.
12 Bad weather had a negative impact on yields and, in specific years, the 
yields fell below trend for wheat and rice in particular. However, the harvested area for corn, for 
example, rose sharply in response to higher prices and by mid-decade there were record global 
crops for corn and oilseeds.  These trends seem to indicate that supply was gradually responding 
to incentives and bad weather was neither generalized nor persistent. Between 2000 and 2007, 
for all grains, harvested area grew at 0.4 percent and yield grew at 1.3 percent per year, which 
equals a 1.7 percent annual growth in supply.
13  
 
On the demand side, consumption for food (including animal feed) of corn, wheat and 
rice was for the most part on trend.  There were no surges in consumption on the part of China 
or India (or by developing countries in the aggregate) for corn, wheat or rice. The exception is 
oilseeds (soybeans in particular) for which the demand from China increased above trend. 
Demand for food consumption (including animal feed) for all grains grew at 1.7 percent per 
year from 2000 to 2007.
14 Hence, excluding the demand for industrial use (biofuels), supply and 
demand grew at the same pace.  
 
In contrast, after legislation on mandates, tariffs, and subsidies was passed in the EU 
and the US
15, the demand for corn and vegetable oils for industrial use (biofuels) rose above 
trend and at an increasing rate. (Figure 3) The use of corn for ethanol grew rapidly from 2004 to 
2007. Feed use of maize, which accounts for 65 percent of global maize use, grew by only 1.5 
percent per year from 2004 to 2007 while ethanol use grew by 36 percent per year and used 70 
                                                 
11 World Bank (2007), p. 62.  
12 Timmer (2008) estimates that lower prices in the previous decade explain around 53 percent of the increase. On the 
harvested area and yield by crop see, for example, Abbott et al. (2008). Also, see Naylor and Falcon (2008). 
13 Mitchell (2008). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Legislation was passed in 2005 and implemented in 2006.   6
percent of the increase in global corn production.
16  Industrial use of vegetable oils (which 
includes biodiesel) grew by 11 percent per annum from 2004 to 2007, compared with 3 percent 
per annum for food use.
17 It is estimated that about one-third of the increase in consumption 
from 2004 to 2007 was due to biodiesel. In Figure 4 we can observe how price increases of corn 
and soybeans accelerated after the demand for corn-based ethanol experienced its rapid 
increase. 
 
In quantitative terms, the contribution of biofuels to the rise in food commodities prices 
has been estimated or calculated using different time periods and prices, different coverage of 
food products, and different methodologies.
18  The general conclusion that emerges from these 
exercises is that the contribution of the expansion of biofuels to observed price increases is 
quantitatively significant.  Collins (2008) estimated that around 60 percent of the increase in 
maize prices from 2006 to 2008 may have been due to the increase in maize used in ethanol.
19 
Mitchell (2008) concludes that 70-75 percent increase in food commodities prices was due to 
biofuels and factors such as low grain stocks, large land use shifts, speculative activity and 
export bans.
20 Using a general equilibrium model, Rosegrant, et al. (2008) estimated the impact 
of the acceleration in biofuel production on weighted cereal prices from 2000 to 2007 to be 30 
percent in real terms.
21 
 
How much of the increase in food commodities prices was caused by policy-induced 
increases in demand for biofuels as opposed to market forces such as higher gasoline prices 
(derived from higher oil prices)?  According to McPhail and Babcock (2008) eliminating 
federal
22 tax credits (for blending ethanol in gas) and tariffs—and, to a much lesser extent, 
mandates—in the United States would reduce ethanol production by 18.6 percent and the price 
of corn would decline by 14.5 percent. While significant, this leaves a large portion of the 
increase unexplained.  If gasoline prices are sufficiently high, the production of biofuels may be 
profitable even without the mandates, tax credits and the like. According to McPhail and 
Babcock (2008)
23, even if government support policies at the federal level are eliminated, if gas 
prices equal 3 dollars per gallon or higher, ethanol production would rise from the current levels 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Author’s calculations based on data from the PSD Database, USDA. 
18For example, computable general equilibrium models (Rosegrant et al., 2008) or partial equilibrium analysis 
(Collins, 2008) or estimated as an accounting residual (Mitchell, 2008). 
19 Mitchell (2008), p. 4. 
20 Ibid., p. 16. 
21 Also, in the short-run, the IMF estimated that the increased demand for biofuels accounted for 70 percent of the 
increase in maize prices and 40 percent of the increase in soybean prices (Lipsky, May 8, 2008). A recent OECD 
report (OECD, 2008) calculates that “current biofuel support measures are estimated to increase average wheat, 
maize and vegetable oil prices by about 5%, 7% and 19%, respectively, in the medium term” (p.9). 
22 In addition to policies at the federal level, there are mandates and other policies at the state level which also affect 
ethanol and biodiesel production. (Elliott, 2008) 
23 http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_12943.pdf.   7
of 6.5 billion gallons to 14 billion gallons and corn price would stay at 4 dollars a bushel
24 (until 
recently prices were around 7 dollars a bushel). In fact, as Elliott (2008) shows the mandated 
levels required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005




Markets were “stressed” before the expansion of biofuels production.
 27 However, in its 
absence, the price increases would have been more moderate, especially for corn. In particular, 
one would have expected the price increases to subside in 2004/05 when there were record 
global harvests in corn and oilseeds.  Instead, price increases for corn accelerated.  Between 
January 2002 and January 2004, for example, the monthly rate of growth for corn prices was 1 
percent on average while between January 2005 and June 2007 the monthly rate of growth rose 
to 2.4 percent on average. With rising oil prices, consumers were willing to pay higher prices 
for biofuels and since global agricultural markets are highly interconnected, rising corn prices 




While the factors—if not the exact orders of magnitude—behind the reversal of the 
trend in food commodities prices since 2002 are more or less understood, a convincing 
explanation of the market dynamics of commodity prices from mid-2007 onwards remains 
elusive.
29 The increase in prices of food commodities—along with other commodities—
accelerated from mid-2007 up until mid-2008 when they began to fall at a fast pace: a third of 
the increase between 2002 and mid-2008 occurred during this twelve-month period (equivalent 
to 15 percent of the time). Understanding the market dynamics of commodity prices during this 
period remains elusive. Three elements might have contributed to these fluctuations: 
                                                 
24 A bushel is equal to 56 pounds. 
25 Signed into law (Public Law 109-58) by President Bush on August 8
th of 2005. 
26 This is not proof that the same increase in biofuels production would have existed without government support. It 
is still possible that without the tax credits or protection from imports, the production of biofuels at those same prices 
would have been lower. According to Naylor and Falcon (2008), in the absence of government support policies, oil 
prices would have to be high enough and corn prices low enough to make ethanol production profitable at 65 percent 
the price of gas . “…[E]thanol has only about two-thirds the energy of gasoline.  In other words, rational consumers 
would pay only about 65% of the price of gasoline for their ethanol, since their cars would go only about 65% as far 
on a tank of fuel.  Since ethanol must be shipped and stored separately, substantial new infrastructure would be 
needed to make it a large-scale choice for fuel, and autos would require so-called “flex” technology to use fuel 
containing high percentages of ethanol.”  
27 For an estimate of the order of magnitude of the impact of past prices on current prices see Timmer (2008). 
28 For example, in 2007 harvested area for corn in the US rose by 23 percent “… in response to high maize prices and 
rapid demand growth for maize for ethanol production. This expansion resulted in a 16 percent decline in soybean 
area … which reduced soybean production and contributed to a 75 percent rise in soybean prices between April 2007 
and April 2008.” (Mitchell, 2008, p. 10)  See Naylor and Falcon (2008) for a description of the interaction between 
ethanol and corn, soybean and wheat price. 
29 One of the reasons of why this is important is because if the factors are other than the fundamentals of demand and 
supply (inflationary expectations or a “bubble”), the behavior of commodity prices during the first half of 2008 would 
have been misleading.  Their rapid increase was interpreted as a validation of the “decoupling” theory (that the rest of 
the world would not be seriously affected by the US slowdown) and let to the implementation of anti-inflationary 
measures when the world was on the verge of a big collapse in demand.    8
macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates in the 
United States, speculation, and interventionist policies on the part of developing countries since 
mid-2007. 
There is casual evidence that the price index of non-oil dollar commodities and the real 
value of the dollar have been inversely related.
30  (Figure 6) As shown in Figure 7, however, 
commodity prices rose in all major currencies.  This is an indication that factors other than the 
depreciation of the dollar played a significant role.  However, it is quite possible that the 
depreciation of the dollar may have affected the short-run dynamics of commodity prices 
because of higher demand stemming from countries whose currencies appreciated vis-à-vis the 
dollar. Available estimates put the commodity price elasticity with respect to the real value of 
the dollar between 0.5 and 1.0.
31 Using the mid-point of these elasticities and the trade-weighted 
depreciation of the dollar, Mitchell (2008) argues that the contribution of dollar weakness to the 
increase in commodity prices between January 2000 and June 2008 could be of the order of 20 
percent (.75 times 26 percent).
32  However, the selection of the mid-point is as good as any 
other; based on the above elasticities the range would go from 13 to 26 percent. 
Since the acceleration in commodity price increases coincided with the onset of the 
sub‐prime crisis in mid‐2007, could the two events be related?  Frankel (2008b) argues that 
the fact that commodity prices rose across the board calls for some macroeconomic explanation.  
For a while, the most popular macro explanation was rapid growth in the world economy. 
However, since mid-2007 (and until mid-2008) price rises accelerated even though the global 
economy was slowing down.
33  According to Frankel (2006), Calvo (2008) and others, one of 
the explanations may be the Federal Reserve’s decision to lower interest rates since mid-2007.  
Lower interest rates increase the demand for or reduce the supply of storable commodities 
                                                 
30 According to Mundell (2002): “[A] casual reading of the statistics suggests that this relationship is quite close. 
Thus the index of non-oil dollar commodities tripled in the 1970s when the dollar was depreciating sharply relative to 
the SDR; it then fell by more than 20 per cent from 1980 to 1986 when the dollar was soaring; then it rose by 50 per 
cent from 1986 to 1995 when the dollar was again depreciating; and it has fallen by 30 per cent since 1995 when the 
dollar has been appreciating. There is therefore a very pronounced association of the cycle of the dollar against other 
major currencies (as measured by the SDR) with the cycle of dollar commodity prices.” 
31 Gilbert (1989) and Baffes (1997). 
32 We must bear in mind, also, that causality runs both ways.  A productivity boost generated by all-purpose 
technology such as the IT “revolution” would result in an appreciation of the currency of the leader in the use of such 
technology and a reduction of commodity prices. On the contrary, an exogenous increase in commodity prices will 
put downward pressure (i.e., towards depreciation) on the currency of importing countries.  If part of the increase in 
commodity prices (food and nonfood) is determined by exogenous factors (such as rapid growth in China), this would 
have put downward pressure on the dollar. However, this would have been countered by the rise in prices of 
commodities where the US is a major exporter. But because the US is a net importer of commodities, it suffered a  
decline in its terms of trade of about 7.5 percent between 2002 and 2007.  
33 The IMF reduced predicted growth rates for the world in 2008 from 5.2 percent in July 2007 to 4.1 percent in 
January 2008 (IMF World Economic Outlook Updates for July 2007 and January 2008). The WEO Update for July 
2008 has kept the 4.1 percent projection for world output growth.   9
through a variety of channels: by decreasing the incentive for pumping oil, mining gold, logging 
forests, culling cattle, etc. today rather than tomorrow; by increasing the desire to hold 
inventories; and, by encouraging investors (or speculators if you wish) to shift out of Treasury 
Bills and into other assets such as foreign currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, 
and  commodities—including food commodities.
34 
The specific mechanism proposed in Frankel’s model is the following.
 35 Commodity 
prices are determined by a number of factors including investors’ asset portfolio decisions. The 
decision whether to hold a commodity for another period (on the ground, in the trees or in the 
form of inventories) or to sell it at today’s price, deposit the proceeds and earn interest, depends 
on the interest rate and the expectations about prices in the future. Thus, through arbitrage 
conditions, the relative price of a commodity (vis-a-vis its long-term equilibrium) is inversely 
related to the real interest rate.  When interest rates are low money flows out of interest-bearing 
instruments and into foreign currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, and   
commodities—including food commodities.  This portfolio shift drives the prices of these assets 
higher and higher until they reach a level where people perceive that they lie “sufficiently” 
above their future long-run equilibrium level.  Monetary policy causes real commodity prices to 
rise initially (they increase more than proportionately than the increase in money supply, for 
example) because other prices are “sticky” (or, in other words, they rise at a slower speed).  
Because of the different speeds of price adjustments and arbitrage conditions regarding price 
expectations and interest rates, commodity prices (and the prices of other assets) overshoot.
36 
 
The role of expansionary monetary policies in explaining rising commodity prices in the 
aftermath of the sub-prime crisis has also been suggested by the Latin American Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee (CLAAF).
37 According to the Committee, “…[W]hile  a 
monetary  explanation  focuses  essentially  on  absolute  price  changes,  it  may  also 
accommodate the possibility of a transitory increase in relative prices. More precisely, an 
increase in inflation, in its initial stages, tends to manifest itself as a non uniform process. 




m a j o r  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  c h a n g e .  T h u s ,  t h e  e n t i r e  e p i s o d e  m i g h t  r e s emble  a  price  bubble. 
                                                 
34 See Frankel (2008a, b, and c) for his comments and exchange with other economists on this issue. 
35 The full model is presented in Frankel (1986).  
36 There has been a lot of debate about whether speculation contributed to the acceleration of commodity prices.  If 
one considers “speculation” any decision that is based on the expectations of the behavior of prices in the future, the 
process described above could be included as part of speculative activities.  
37 CLAAF (2008).    10




Frankel (2006) provides econometric evidence in support of the inverse relationship 
between commodity prices and real interest rates in the US dating back to the 1950s which is 
generally robust.
39 Casual observation (Figure 8) suggests that the decisions to lower interest 
rates by the Federal Reserve in mid-2007 were followed by an acceleration in the price 
increases. However, after mid‐2007 commodity prices have fallen in tandem with interest 
rates: between June 2008--when the IMF’s Food Commodity Price Index peaked—and October 






United States.  The importance of expansionary monetary policy or financial speculation as a 
cause of the acceleration of the commodity price increases has been dismissed because, if that 
were the case, one would have observed an increase in stocks of commodities—including food 
commodities.
41 However, in the case of certain commodities such as oil or metals, stocks can be 
accumulated in “invisible” ways: by drilling or mining less. In the case of agricultural 
commodities, this option does not really exist because one cannot accumulate them by simply 
not harvesting a crop.  But, as Calvo (2008) has argued, in the face of highly inelastic demand, 
the desired level of stocks may increase, but given the short run inelastic nature of supply, this 
may express itself through rising prices rather than higher stocks.
42 Furthermore, it is probably 
naïve to think that stocks accumulated by sovereign governments are public knowledge in full.
43 
Finally, because of the recently created link between food commodities and fossil fuels through 
                                                 
38 Also, see Rojas-Suarez (2008). 
39 Frankel (2006). 
40 Another factor which has been mentioned to explain the acceleration in commodity price increases since mid-2007 
is speculation in financial markets and the rise in the participation of index funds.  So far, the evidence for this is very 
limited. World Bank (2008c)  
41 See, for example, Krugman (2008).  
42 Note, by the way, that government interventions to restrict exports and expand subsidies contributed to the 
inelasticity of supply and demand. 
43 In addition, in the case of agricultural commodities in particular, accumulation of stocks may be “invisible” 
because it is done by millions of consumers buying additional amounts which although small individually, can add up 
and put upward pressure on prices.  If, for example, if we take half of the population of India, China, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh (a total of 1,428,658,500 persons, WEO data) and assume an increase in the amount of rice bought by 
consumers of 10 kilos per year per person, this would result in an increase in demand in the order of 14,286,585,000 
kilos or 14,286,585 tons. With world rice production at 430.72 million tons in 2008 (USDA) this represents 3.3% of 
world production or 5% of the production in these four countries (which in 2008/2009 is estimated  at 292 million 
tons, USDA). In addition, export restrictions imposed by governments are tantamount to a form of speculation 
because they also restrict supply available in world markets.    11
the biofuels nexus, part of the impact of lower interest rates on food commodities prices may be 
indirect (that is, there is no need to observe an accumulation of their inventories).









It is important to bear in mind that the explanations of the acceleration in commodity 
price increases based on real vs. monetary factors, though clearly distinct, are not mutually 
exclusive. The explanation which emphasizes the workings of physical demand and supply for 
commodities, considers inflation a consequence of these persistent relative price changes.  In 
contrast, for the monetary explanation, the increase in the relative price of commodities is partly 
endogenous: a consequence of expansionary monetary policy. But both may be and are likely to 
have been at play. 
 
Starting in the last quarter of 2007, developing country governments introduced 
administrative measures to ban or restrict exports and put bids on purchases of food 
commodities. (Figures 9a and 9b)  These measures exacerbated the upward pressure of food 
commodities prices in international prices.
45 The impact was particularly strong in the case of 
rice.
46 In Figure 10 one can observe how acceleration in the price increases of rice coincided 
with some key countries introducing administrative measures that affected supply or demand. In 
Africa, the domino effect on other prices did not wait; with rice and other imported cereals in 
short supply, the price of locally grown crops such as millet and sorghum rose.
47  In an attempt 
to quantify the impact of administrative measures on world prices, Ivanic, Martin, Mattoo and  
Subramanian (2008) show that if developing countries try to offset a fifty percent increase in the 
world prices of rice, corn, wheat and soybeans applying policy responses aimed at restoring 
individual countries' domestic prices, world market prices will rise by 10 to 30 percentage 
points.  
 
                                                 
44 However, correlation is not proof of causality.  The spike in prices could also be explained by the nonlinearities 
present in tight commodity markets which were subject to additional shocks such as the administrative decisions 
mentioned above (export bans, export taxes, etc.). And the recent fall could be explained by the expected downward 
pressure on prices resulting from a slowdown in global growth. In addition, the inverse relation between commodity 
prices and interest rates does not always hold empirically.  
45 See Ivanic , Martin, Mattoo and  Subramanian (2008). 
46 See Slayton and Timmer (2008), Naylor and Falcon (2008). 
47 Naylor and Falcon (2008) and the article by Fleshman (2008).    12
The fact that food commodities have become a profitable alternative for the production 
of fossil fuel energy substitutes has important implications.
48  In contrast to food being used for 
consumption purposes whose income-elasticity is below unity (Engel’s Law), the income 
elasticity for food commodities for industrial purposes could equal unity or more.
49  This turn of 
events significantly alters the forces at play in food commodities markets and--depending on 
what happens to oil prices, biofuels subsidies and mandates and research on the agricultural 
frontier--food could become permanently more expensive in a nontrivial way. Von Braun 
(2008a) argues that with the current growth path of biofuel production, i.e. with the actual 
expansion plans for biofuels, oilseeds and corn prices would increase by 18 and 26 percent, 
respectively, by 2020.
 50  In contrast, the “business as usual”—that is, without biofuels--scenario 
mentioned above predicted an increase in food commodities prices of .26 percent per year or 
around 5 percent by 2020. In addition, the new link between the prices of food commodities and 
the prices of energy commodities makes the prices of the former much more sensitive to the 
business cycle and the vicissitudes of financial markets.  While it is too early to test the latter 
using econometric techniques, the (de-trended) correlation between oil prices and corn prices 
since 2004, for example, is much higher than it was in the previous decades: it rose from .36 
during the period 1957-2003 to .65 during the period 2004-2008.
51 
 
 2.  Rising Food Prices, Inflation and Poverty  
 
 
For developing countries, the impact of rising food commodities prices on inflation and 
poverty are of particular concern. Although domestic food prices have not risen as rapidly as 
international prices,
52 IMF (2008) estimates found that—between December 2007 and March 
2008-- the median 12-month rate of food price inflation for a sample of 120 non-OECD 
countries rose from 10 percent to 12 percent, almost twice the median food price inflation rate 
of 2006. (Figure 11)  Similarly, World Bank (2008b) found that food inflation rose by around 
20% in Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Costa Rica and reached 30% in countries like Kyrgyz 
Republic and Sri Lanka in the same period.  According to  World Bank (2008c) headline 
inflation in developing countries rose by 5 percentage points between 2006 and 2008 and more 
                                                 
48 By this we mean the use of food commodities to produce energy for cars and machines.  
49 The long-run income elasticity of energy and oil has been estimated at approximately 1.0 for the non-OECD 
countries (Gately and Huntington, 2001).  
 
50 According to OECD (2008) estimates, a full implementation of the recently enacted US Energy Independence and 
Security Act and the currently proposed new EU Directive for Renewable Energy, close to 20% of global vegetable 
oil production and more than 13% of world coarse grain output could shift to biofuels production”. The EU directives 
were revised so their impact needs to be re-estimated. 
51 Correlations were estimated using the de-trended monthly series of commodity prices published by the 
International Monetary Fund in the International Financial Statistics.  
52 The World Bank (2008c) finds that among 73 countries for which monthly consumer price index and household 
survey data are available, the majority had real food price increases of 12 percent or less.    13
than 30 developing countries featured double digit inflation rates. With the fall in commodity 
prices, headline inflation is declining in the second half of 2008. 
 
The fact that rising food commodities prices cause inflationary pressures in poorer 
countries should not come as a surprise since food represents such a high percentage of their 
consumption basket. For example, in Nigeria, about 70 percent of income is spent on food, 75 
percent in Vietnam, and 50 percent in Indonesia compared with 12 percent in the United States.  
However, inflationary pressures affected middle-income countries with very diverse policy 
regimes: Chile, Venezuela, and several Eastern European and Central Asian countries.  This is 
an area that deserves further research. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that since the reported numbers refer to actual inflation 
rates, they do not necessarily reflect the “true” inflationary pressures stemming from higher 
international food commodities prices.  Actual inflation not only reflects inflationary dynamics 
but also the policy measures that governments take to respond to them.  These policies can 
range from restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to interventions in specific markets (e.g., 
price controls, export bans, consumer subsidies and so on).  An indicator that governments 
faced important inflationary pressures is that several monetary authorities increased interest 
rates by 25 basis points or more
53 despite its dampening effect on output. Another indicator is 
that, as mentioned in the previous section, many governments implemented trade, fiscal and 
administrative policies to contain the increase in domestic food prices. In the absence of these 
policies, inflation would have been even higher than what was observed. 
 
What is the impact of higher food commodities prices on poverty? Since the poor 
include both net consumers and net sellers of food commodities, a change in their price in either 
direction will inevitably hurt some of the poor and benefit some of the poor at the same time. 
Small poor farmers tend to benefit from higher food prices.  However, the poor in urban areas 
and those in rural areas with little or no access to land are hurt, and hurt badly, when food prices 
increase.  This contradictory impact of food prices on the poor has been known as the “food 
price dilemma.”
54  This dilemma has been the source of a futile debate regarding when the poor 
are better off: when food prices go up or when they go down? Policymakers should simply 
accept that if food prices rise (fall) poor net buyers (net sellers) will need help and poor net 
sellers (net buyers) will be better off.  In either case, safety net programs will have to be 
                                                 
53 This happened in Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. (World Bank, 2008c) 
54 Timmer, Falcon and Pearson (1983), Chapter 1. This dilemma has been analyzed empirically for a number of 
countries.  See, for example, Ackah and Appleton (2007); Barrett and Dorosh (1996); Deaton (1989); Lustig (1986); 
Mellor (1978); Pinstrup-Andersen (1987); Ravallion and van de Walle (1991); Ravallion (1990); Trairatvorakul 
(1984).   14
expanded in coverage and size to compensate the group of the poor who get hurt. In addition, 
when food commodities prices increase, there is an opportunity to help poor net sellers translate 
this windfall into a more long-term improvement in living standards. With respect to the net 
impact on poverty (i.e., on summary measures such as the headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio 
and the poverty gap ratio square), available evidence suggests that among the poorest 
households, the decline in living standards of net consumers caused by higher food prices 




As a general proposition, the impact on poverty generated by an increase in the price of 
food will depend on: i. the relative importance of different food commodities in the production 
set and consumption basket of different households and the difference between the two
56; ii. the 
magnitude of the relative price change; iii. households’ ability to substitute between food items; 
and, iv. the degree to which households are compensated for the price shocks by changes in 
their income (i.e., by the indirect effect on wages and employment originated by the price 
change). 
57  Evidence suggests that the poor spend between 50 and 70 percent of their income on 
food on average
58, the proportion of poor people who are net buyers of food tends to dominate 
over the share of net sellers, the increase in domestic food price—though much lower than that 
observed for international prices-- has been significant, although households do substitute more 
expensive for less expensive food in the case of basic staples this substitution is limited, and the 
positive effects on wages take time. 
 
 Table 3 presents a summary of the estimates obtained by a series of recent studies 
which use different methods, poverty lines and assumptions about price increases, pass-through 
to domestic prices, substitution effects, and wage effects. Also, some include net sellers while 
others don’t.  The orders of magnitude of the estimated short-term impact of higher food prices 
on poverty are significant. Ivanic and Martin (2008a) show that about 105 million people in the 
least developed countries have been added to the world’s poor since 2005 because of rising food 
prices.  This is equivalent to about 10 percent of the people living on less than a dollar a day 
                                                 
55Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008), for example, argue that many of the poor are net sellers of food commodities so 
that higher prices is a benefit to them. While this is true, the studies that estimate the full impact (i.e., on net sellers 
and net buyers), find that higher food prices result in an increase in the headcount and poverty gap ratios in the 
overwhelming majority of cases (Ivanic and Martin, 2008a; Wodon et al., 2008; Robles et al., 2008; CEPAL, 2008). 
56 For poor farmers, the difference is often positive indicating that they benefit from a price increase. In contrast, poor 
urban households or landless agricultural workers are net consumers of food commodities and get hurt by an increase 
in their price. 
57 To estimate the latter, one must be able to estimate the spillover effects; this has been done using multi-sectoral and 
full-fledged computable general equilibrium models. Some CGEs are Walrasian, that is, all markets clear via prices 
and there is no unemployment.  Others are more heterodox: they assume flexible prices in some markets but in others 
prices are determined as a mark-up above costs and total employment is endogenously determined by the level of 
aggregate demand. 
58 World Bank (2008c), p. 119.   15
and, according to the authors, equivalent to approximately seven lost years of progress in 
poverty reduction. Even middle-income Latin America has not remained impervious: Robles et 
al.( 2008) estimate that the increase in world food prices between January 2006 and March 2008 
resulted in an increase of 4.3 percentage points in the headcount ratio or 21  million additional 
poor individuals.
59 CEPAL (2008)—the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean-- estimates that the ranks of the extremely poor and the moderately poor increased by 
10 million each.
 60 The Asian Development Bank (2008) suggests that a 20% increase in food 
prices would raise the number of poor individuals by 5.65 and 14.67 million in Philippines and 
Pakistan, respectively.
61 
62  So, in spite of all the differences in methodology and assumptions, 
these studies suggest that in the majority of countries, higher food commodities prices increase 
poverty.  Although poverty increases considerably more in urban areas, with the exception of a 
few cases rural poverty goes up as well.
63  
 
Research on specific countries re-enforces this result. Haq et al. (2008) found that food 
price increases in Pakistan might have increased urban poverty by 44.6 percent and rural 
poverty by 32.5 percent. Valero-Gil and Valero (2008) find that the spike in food prices during 
2008 had a significant effect on poverty even after taking into account the positive effects of 
reduced taxes and tariffs and higher cash transfers to the poor.  According to them, moderate 
consumption poverty increased from 25 to 33.5 percent and extreme poverty from 10.58 to 
15.95 percent. Warr (2008) finds that  higher food prices, especially staple grains, worsen 
poverty incidence in Thailand despite the presence of large numbers of poor farmers, many of 
whom benefit from higher prices. 
 
3. Policy Dilemmas caused by Rising Food Prices 
   
Given their impact on inflation and poverty, rising food commodities prices pose 
significant policy dilemmas to developing countries. The conventional wisdom among 
                                                 
59 Regional numbers for Latin America are own calculations based on Robles et al. (2008) country-by-country 
estimations for net increase in poverty. 
59  
60 CEPAL (2008) assumes that incomes rose at the same pace as the consumer price index. 
61 For a more extreme scenario of 30% increase in food prices, the number of poor people increases by 8.85 and 
21.96 million in Philippines and Pakistan, respectively. 
62 It is important to point out that these estimates on the poverty impact of higher food prices do not take into account 
the positive effect that higher food commodities prices has had on economic growth in net exporting countries.  In 
these countries, the net effect of the commodity boom may well be a reduction in poverty.  At present none of the 
estimates account for this impact.  Since net exporters are fewer and richer than the net importers, the overall impact 
on poverty may not change much even if the commodity boom-driven growth dividend for net exporters is taken into 
account. However, future research should also estimate the reduction in poverty caused by commodity-boom induced 
growth in net exporters. In addition to their impact on macroeconomic performance and poverty, rising food prices 
were a source of social unrest and created severe budgetary difficulties for food aid programs and made planning for 
food relief excruciatingly difficult.  
 
63 World Bank (2008c), p. 116.   16
economists is that short-run problems associated with high prices of staple foods are best dealt 
with by appropriate macroeconomic instruments and targeted safety nets.  However, as we shall 
see below, the policy dilemmas and challenges faced by governments in developing countries 
are substantial.   
 
To fend off inflationary pressures, monetary authorities have two options: to 
accommodate the price increases as a one-time spike in the rate of inflation or to stick to the 
inflation target through tight monetary policy.  Tight monetary policy has a dampening effect on 
economic activity.  However, accommodation puts the hard-won credibility of central banks at 
risk and this risk has to be weighed against the costs of tight monetary policy in terms of 
foregone output.  Also, for countries in which wage and price indexation is common, it will be 
hard to prevent the initial increase in inflation from becoming entrenched. But given that 
fulfilling the inflation targets may mean that nonfood prices must fall in nominal terms, 
governments find it hard not to acquiesce to some degree of accommodation.
 64  Without it 
losses in economic activity are likely and this, in turn, would exacerbate the impact on poverty. 
In addition, the recessionary impact of tight monetary policy might reduce the fiscal resources 
available to compensate the poor through targeted safety nets.  
 
In countries with large international reserves and sound fiscal and external stances, 
monetary authorities could use part of the reserves to encourage an appreciation of the currency 
which would immediately reduce the impact of higher international food commodities prices on 
domestic prices.  However, relying on a macroeconomic price such as the exchange rate to 
deflect inflationary pressures has its costs. It creates disincentives to exporters and hurts import-
competing sectors and, in more extreme cases, it can slow down growth.  
 
The uncertainty regarding the causes and duration of rising food prices make the 
dilemmas even more complex.  In the case where the former are the result of global inflationary 
pressures associated with US monetary policy, an appreciation of the currency—whenever 
feasible—is an appropriate response.  However, as it was mentioned in section 2, if food 
commodities price increases are subject to overshooting or are caused by a price bubble, then 
international prices are reflecting a transient distortion.  Under such circumstances, using the 
heavy artillery of higher interest rates or an appreciation of the currency would result in 
“overkill.”  The problem is that in the midst of the process nobody can be sure if the price 
increases are temporary or what portion of their acceleration reflects a distortion versus global 
inflation or changes in fundamentals. 
                                                 
64 Even the IMF (2008) has recognized that inflation targets might have to be missed in order to avoid an excessive 
reduction in output or output growth. Also, see Dervis (2008).   17
 
Suppose now that governments accept the conventional wisdom and want to focus on 
protecting the poor from the impact of higher domestic food prices. Are developing countries 
ready? In particular, do safety net programs exist and can they be easily expanded?  Do 
governments have the fiscal space to accommodate the additional resources needed to fund the 
safety net? Figure 12 presents the safety net programs available in low and middle-income 
countries by category: cash transfers, food for work, food ration/stamp and school feeding 
programs. Unfortunately, according to this information, 19 (out of 49) low-income and 49 (out 
of 95) middle-income countries do not have safety net programs of any kind.   
 
Moreover, given the characteristic of the adverse shock—i.e., an increase in the price of 
a good that takes up a substantial portion of a poor person’s budget—the most adequate safety 
net is to compensate the affected population for their loss in purchasing power in cash.
65  
Although cash transfer programs (conditional and unconditional) are increasingly more 
common, they are still not pervasive. According to Figure 12 there are 16 (out of 49) low-
income and 37 (out of 95) middle-income countries that have cash transfer programs.  In the 
absence of cash transfer programs, countries could resort to school feeding programs. While 
they will not compensate the poor for the loss of purchasing power associated with higher food 
prices, school feeding programs can insulate (at least in part) children of poor households from 
suffering a cut in their food intake as a result of higher food prices.  School feeding programs 
are a bit more common in low-income countries than cash transfer programs but still only 24 
low-income countries have them.   
 
In addition to the fact that there are many low- and middle-income countries which do 
not have safety net programs, those which exist may be too limited in coverage.  In the case of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the coverage of cash transfer programs exceeds 
25 percent of the population living in poverty in 8 out of 26 countries: Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama. The good news is that the two largest 
countries with the highest number of poor people in the region, Brazil and Mexico, have among 
the best functioning cash transfer programs in the world.
66 The poorest countries in the region, 
however, either do not have programs or have them in a limited scale.   
 
Furthermore, most of these programs do not have a mechanism to incorporate the “new” 
poor or increase the size of the benefits in the face of adverse shocks as part of their design.  
                                                 
65 Since the problem is loss in purchasing power and not in employment, expanding food-for-work or cash-for-work 
programs is not the most adequate response and could potentially introduce distortions in the allocation of labor 
supply on the part of poor households. However, increasing the wage paid in cash-for-work programs is. 
66 Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico.   18
Some governments (Brazil and Mexico, for example) have increased the transfer to compensate 
for the loss in its purchasing power. However, the programs have not incorporated as 
beneficiaries those who became poor as a result of the food price increase.  So far it is not clear 
how many of the countries with cash transfer programs have increased the amount of the 
transfer and incorporated the “new” poor into the program (or implemented a complementary 
program).
67   
 
In sum, the existing safety net systems in developing countries leave much to be 
desired. In too many countries it is either inexistent or small; and, even in countries in which 
cash transfer programs are large and effective in addressing chronic poverty, they are not 
designed to respond to shocks.  This means that the majority of the poor who have been hurt or 
those who have become poor as a result of higher food prices were not being protected from the 
impact of higher food prices on their living standards.  In cases in which these programs were 
expanded, this was done as an ad hoc measure implemented many months (or even years) after 
food price increases appeared on the scene. In addition, low-income countries in particular may 
not have the fiscal space to finance an expansion let alone launch new safety net programs.  
There is no available data in the public domain as to how many countries may be in such 
position.
68   
 
Confronted with lacking or inadequate safety nets, unpalatable macroeconomic choices, 
and uncertainty about the evolution of international food commodities prices, governments 
throughout the developing world implemented a series of administrative policies designed to 
insulate domestic food prices from their fluctuations in world markets. More than 80 developing 
countries for which data is available put in place at least one of the following: reduced import 
tariffs or other taxes, relaxed import restrictions, increased general consumer subsidies, raised 
export taxes, or introduced price controls, export restrictions or outright bans. (Figure 9a)  The 
World Bank surveyed 118 countries and found that the most frequently adopted policies were 
food price controls, reduced food taxes, and consumption subsidies.
 69 (Figure 9b) Also, about a 
third of the countries implemented export restrictions.  These measures were implemented even 
by countries with adequate safety net programs.
70  This should not come as a surprise. Targeted 
safety nets do not help contain inflationary pressures or social discontent among low-income 
                                                 
67 There is evidence that Ethiopia increased the wage rate in its cash-for-work program and that other poor countries 
have relied on food-for-work, food distribution and school feeding programs to transfer resources to the poor. For a 
discussion on this see Revenga (2008). 
68 IMF (2008) indicates which countries need the IMF because of balance of payments vulnerability but there is no 
indication how many countries may need it to expand or implement a safety net. 
69 See, for example, Revenga (2008), Ivanic and Martin (2008b) and Wodon and Zaman (2008).  
70 Mexico, for example, increased the size of the transfers in its cash transfer program but it also lowered tariffs on 
agricultural goods and inputs, implemented some forms of “soft” price controls and increased general subsidies on 
some food staples.   19
urban workers who are not poor enough to be included in the safety net system but are hurt by 
rising food prices. 
 
With the exception of import-liberalizing and tax reducing policies, the rest has elicited 
quite a bit of criticism from multilateral institutions.  The former are more acceptable to the 
mainstream because they are considered to be efficiency-enhancing and consistent with a rules-
based trading system. Heterodox measures such as export restrictions, general subsidies or price 
controls raise concern because they distort producers’ and consumers’ response, defer and may 
worsen inflationary pressures, and can channel large amounts of scarce government resources to 
the non-poor.  However, reducing tariffs and taxes also lowers government revenues which may 
not be desirable for countries facing fiscal imbalances. It addition, it is not infrequent that 
countries face political resistance to apply an ad valorem tax on food staples so once they are 
lowered it may be very difficult to raise them in the future. All of these administrative 
measures—including reducing import tariffs and other taxes on food items--exacerbate the 
upward pressure on commodity prices hurting food commodity importers and, in the extreme, 
can be self-defeating.  However, an appreciation of the currency, a policy that has been 
recommended by some mainstream macroeconomists, could also exacerbate the upward 
pressure on international prices.
71      
 
The “best” policy option for individual countries will depend on two crucial factors: 
what the government’s objective function is and where it enjoys the most degrees of freedom.  
If a government is concerned about containing inflation and at the same preserving the 
credibility of the central bank, it may choose a policy path that is different from that of a 
government whose objective is to minimize the impact on the poor or to maintain social and 
political stability in the urban areas under limited fiscal and institutional resources.  Countries 
with large international reserves, robust safety nets and fiscal space will choose a policy mix 
that is different from countries that have none of these. The fact that so many governments—
from populist Argentina to conservative Mexico to pragmatic China, for example-- chose to use 
administrative measures may be an indication that—despite their costs—they were viewed as 
the best option under the circumstances.
72  
                                                 
71 Even safety nets to the poor could put upward pressure on international prices. However, the increase in demand 
for food resulting from an expansion of safety nets is bound to be lower than, for instance, general consumption 
subsidies or price controls. In addition, safety nets do not lower the price to the supplier allowing for a positive 
response on their part to take place. 
72 The choice of which specific administrative measures to use should be based on “common sense” criteria.  For 
example, governments should choose those price policy interventions which are more easily reversed (that is, they do 
not become hijacked by special interest groups), least distortionary, least regressive, more consistent with a rules-
based trading system, simple to implement from an administrative point of view and do not cause unsustainable fiscal 
imbalances.
  In this process government are likely to face complex and difficult to quantify trade-offs. 
   20
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Starting in 2002, international food commodities prices experienced large fluctuations.  
When prices were rising, developing countries faced significant policy dilemmas. Confronted 
with inflationary pressures, increasing poverty and social unrest, the vast majority of 
governments introduced beggar-thy-neighbor policies that reduced the welfare of particularly 
food-importing countries and undermined a rules-based trading system. This elicited substantial 
criticism from multilateral organizations and mainstream economists. Rather than trying to 
insulate domestic prices—it is argued—, governments should let prices adjust to reflect the 
change in international prices and use targeted safety nets to compensate the poor.  However, as 
we saw above, safety nets in many developing countries are lacking or inadequate.  If they are 
to be used in future episodes of rising food prices, they need to be put in place now. In 
particular, multilateral organizations should work with governments to implement cash transfer 
programs so that the poor can quickly and efficiently be compensated for the loss in purchasing 
power when food prices rise.  It is essential that the new or existing programs are designed in 
such a way so that they can increase (decrease) the size of the transfer and the number of 
beneficiaries when the shock occurs (unwinds).  That is, they should include an “insurance” 
component; this is not a feature which current programs have.
73  In addition, governments 
should have mechanisms in place to ensure than when cash transfers need to be expanded, they 
will have the required fiscal space.   
 
Even if adequate safety nets are in place, however, governments in developing countries 
would still need to cope with inflationary pressures and social discontent among urban 
households who are not poor enough to be included in the safety net programs but are hurt by 
higher food prices.  Thus, the temptation to insulate domestic prices with beggar-thy-neighbor 
administrative measures will continue to exist.  Moreover, these measures may not be 
inadequate if food price volatility in international markets is reflecting transient distortions 
resulting from global inflationary pressures or a food commodities price bubble.  Among 
interventionist measures, however, some may be less problematic than others. The conventional 
wisdom in economics is that using taxes, subsidies and tariffs is better than price controls and 
export bans. But the availability of fiscal resources and political economy dynamics may change 
the ranking of policies.  
 
                                                 
73For a discusión on how the cash transfer programs can be adapted to incorporate an “insurance” component, see De 
Janvry et al. (2008).   21
As long as food commodities prices are subject to large fluctuations in international 
markets, it will be difficult to persuade developing countries not to implement measures that 
exacerbate the upward pressure on them.  This will be particularly so in periods of high 
volatility, when price increases accelerate and governments in developing countries find it 
difficult to address the challenges to price stability, poverty reduction and social peace that 
soaring food prices cause.  These welfare-decreasing measures could be avoided if international 
food commodities prices could be stabilized.  The international community through a 
multilateral organization such as the World Food Program should explore how to create a public 
reserve of food staples to reduce price volatility.
74 Recognizing that such an initiative would be 
costly and difficult to manage, these costs should be weighed against the benefits in terms of 
poverty reduction, nutrition and social stability that it would bring. In addition, public reserves 




                                                 
74 See the proposal made by Lin (2008), for example. 
75 Dealing with secular upward pressures on international food commodities prices caused by the surge in the 
production of biofuels will require a different approach.  Certainly subsidies for biofuels production in advanced 
countries should be eliminated. However, if the price of gasoline gets to be high enough, it will be profitable to 
produce them without subsidies. In this case, countries may have to consider a tax on biofuels production. Otherwise, 
it will be increasingly difficult to protect the poor in developing countries from the impact of rising food prices. 
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Table 2. World Demand and Supply Summary: Corn, Wheat, Rice and Soybeans 







































































































Source: Author’s elaboration based on “*” Mitchell (2008), Abbott et al. (2008) and own 
calculations based on USDA data.  
a. Ethanol is produced from sugar crops, such as sugar cane or beets, or starchy crops such as 
maize. Biodiesel is produced from vegetable oils or animal fats. 
b. The United States is the largest producer of ethanol from maize and is expected to use about 
81 million tons for ethanol in the 2007/08 crop year. Canada, China and the European Union 
used roughly an additional 5 million tons of maize for ethanol in 2007 (USDA 2008a), bringing 
the total use of maize for ethanol to 86 million tons, about 11% of global maize production. The 
U.S. accounts for about one-third of global maize production and two-thirds of global exports 
and used 25 percent of its production for ethanol in 2007/08. The largest biodiesel producers 
were the European Union, the United States, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil, with a combined 
use of vegetable oils for biodiesel of about 8.6 million tons in 2007 compared with global 
vegetable oils production of 132 million tons. (Mitchell, 2008)   24
 Table 3. Poverty Impacts of Recent Increases in Food Prices: A Summary of Available 
Studies 
 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) Wodon et al. (2008) ADB (2008) IADB (2008) CEPAL (2008)
RESULTS
Poverty increases in all 
countries with the 
exception of Peru. The 
2005-2008Q1 price 
increase scenario 
increases national poverty 
rates by 4.5 percentage 
points on average 
(calculating estimates for 
all low income countries: 
additional 105 million 
people in poverty). 
Poverty increases. A 50% 
increase in prices leads to 
an average increase of the 
headcount poverty of 4.4 
percentage points (or 2.5 
with producer impacts). An 
average increase of 3.5 
percentage points at the 
national level in SSA would 




in the short-term. In 
the medium-term it 
depends. A 20% food 
price increase in 
Philippines and 
Pakistan increases 
the number of poor 
by 5.65 and 14.67 
million, respectively. 
Poverty increases by 
4.3 percentage points 
or  21 million additional 
poor individuals (net 
effect)*. For example, 
total income poverty 
increases by 8 
percentage points in 
Guatemala (net effect 
of intl. price increase), 
6.9 in Mexico and 6.5 
in El Salvador
Indigence increases 
from 12.7 (68.5 million 
people) to 14.7 (79.1 
million people) with 
income effects. 
Poverty increases 
from 35.1 (189.5 
million people) to 37 






Peru, Vietnam and Zambia
Burkina Faso, DRC, Ghana, 
Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 





Nineteen countries in 
LAC
Estimates are for 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole
METHOD
Short-term impact; 
Deaton's framework and 
GTAP for wage effects





with budget shares 
only and no income 
shares; medium term 




Upper bound increase 
poverty line by 30% 
(multiplication of 
increase in world 
prices of commodities 
(.68) times average 
share of six food 
commodities (.435) 
while rest of prices are 
assumed unchanged). 
Lower bound assumes 
an increase in 
agricultural workers' 
income equal to world 
price increases
Not described in note 





Upper bound estimates 
include net-buyers only; 
lower bound estimates 
assume net-sellers receive 
price increase in full
Short-term estimates 
includes buyers only; 
medium-term CGE 
should include effects 
on net sellers
No No














Three simulations: 1. 10% 
uniform increase/pass 
through equal to 1; 2. 
2005-07 actual FAO/pass 
through .66; 3. 2005-
2008Q1**
Simulate price increases of 
25% and 50%; price 
increases are the same for 
all countries and all food 
items
Simulate food price 
increases of 10%, 
20% and 30% 
Simulates the impact of 
the IFS estimate of 
price increases for six 
commodities from Jan 
06 to March 08 
(68.1%); full pass 
through to domestic 
prices. Also, simulates 
price increases 
estimated by central 
banks
Assumes a 15% 
increase in food 
prices











Headcount ratio and 
poverty gap ratio
Headcount ratio
Change in absolute 
number of poor; Gini 
coefficient
Headcount ratio and 
poverty gap ratio
Headcount ratio and 




Poverty line; price 
increases; labor market 
segmentation
Simulation of two levels of 
price increases and upper 
and lower bounds
Simulation of three 
levels of price 
increases
None that are 
mentioned
None that are 
mentioned
 
* Own calculations based on the paper.  
** For the 2005 to 2008.Q1 authors attempted to at what had actually happened to domestic 
prices. If a currency had appreciated against the USD, then the domestic price increase for these 
commodities was assumed to be smaller than the increase in $ and we first made that 
adjustment. If other prices had increased, and we tracked this using 
inflation over the period, then the increase in food prices had to be compared relative to that 
increase in prices. So there were two adjustments-- one for the exchange rate and one for 
increases in the general price level.    25
 


























































































































































































Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database.   26












































































































































































































































Corn Soybeans Wheat Rice
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Commodity prices refer to: Maize (corn), 
U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tonne; Rice, 5 percent 
broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per metric tonne; Soybeans, U.S. 
soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par, US$ 
per metric tonne; Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ 
per metric tonne.   27
























































Source: Author's construction based on the IMF Primary Commodities Database and USDA 
Feedgrains Database. Information for mandates is from Table 3. 
Notes: Prices refer to Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price 
(average of daily quotations). Calculations of corn for fuel are for the United States. Corn prices 
for 2008 are averages from January 2008 to July 2008.   28





































































Source: Author's construction based on IMF Primary Commodity Database and Renewable 
Fuels Association. Information for mandates is from Table 3. 
Notes: Ethanol production is for the United States. Prices refer to Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 
Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price (average of daily quotations); Soybeans, U.S. 
soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par 
(average of daily quotations).   29
Figure 5. Gasoline prices and U.S. ethanol production, 1995-2007 
 




























Ethanol production Unleaded regular
Indicates 2005 Energy 
Act biofuel mandate level
California, NY 
begin to phase 
out/ban MTBE in 
gasoline  30
















































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s construction based on data from the International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
Notes: The real effective exchange rate (RER) refers to the US real exchange rate (2000=100) 
based on RNULC 
(Relative Normalised Unit Labour Cost). Food prices refer to a food commodities price index 
(2000=100).   31

















































































































































































Source: Author’s construction with data from IFS, IMF for prices and OECD Stat for exchange 
rates.  32













































































































































































































































Source: Author’s construction based on data from the IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database 
and Federal Reserve. 
Notes: Vertical lines shows periods in which the Fed's primary credit rate was lowered as 
specified in the graph's text. The primary credit rate fell from 6.25 in June 2007 to 2.25 in June 
2008 and further to 1.25 at the end of October (the discount rate is the interest rate charged by 
the Fed to commercial banks and other depository institutions on short-term loans (overnight)). 
The federal funds rate started to fall in August 2007 (after stability since mid-2006) from 5.02 to 
2.01 by July 2008; at the end of October 2008 it was 1.00 (“the federal funds rate is the interest 
rate at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other depository 
institutions overnight”; for more information visit www.federalreserve.gov). IMF prices for 
each product refer to: (i) Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price 
(average of daily quotations); (ii) Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract 
(first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par (average of daily quotations); (iii) Wheat, No.1 
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Source: Author’s construction with information from the World Bank (2008d) and expanded 
with Trostle (2008), ADB (2008) and World Bank (2008e). 
 
Figure 9b. Policy Measures to Contain Price Increases: Sub-Saharan Africa and Rest of 
the World 
Figure 3. Food Price Policies of African countries 
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Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Export policies from Slayton and Timmer 
(2008) and Timmer (2008). Based on a graph by Slayton and Timmer (2008).    35





















Source: IMF (2008).   36
Figure 12. The Food Crisis: Safety Nets in Low and  Middle-Income Countries 
 
Source: Author’s construction with information from the World Bank (2008d) and expanded 
with ADB (2008) and World Bank (2008e). Income classification data from the World Bank. 
The World Bank classifies 49 countries as low-income and 95 as middle-income; in the graph 
are those countries that implemented one or more programs (30 low income and 46 middle 
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